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THEFT, EXTORTION, AND THE CONSTITUTION: LAND USE
PRACTICE NEEDS AN ETHICAL INFUSION
Michael M. Berger*

ABSTRACT
There are many ways in which property owners/developers interact
with regulators. To the extent that texts and articles deal with the
ethical duties of the regulators, they tend to focus on things like
conflicts of interest. But there is more. This article will examine
numerous other ways in which regulators may run afoul of ethical
practice in dealing with those whom they regulate.

Senior Counsel, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP; co-chair of the firm’s Appellate
Practice Group. I have spent more than a half-century defending the rights of private
property owners in court, including arguing four regulatory takings cases in the
United States Supreme Court and participating as amicus curiae in many of the other
important land use/takings cases of this era. I have also taught takings and land use
law at the law schools of the University of Miami, Washington University in St.
Louis, and the University of Southern California. I would like to thank Professors
Gideon Kanner and Janet Madden for their helpful comments as this was being
written.
*
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INTRODUCTION
When Socrates and his two great disciples composed a
system of rational ethics they were hardly proposing
practical legislation for mankind . . . . They were merely
writing an eloquent epitaph for their country. 1

I will leave it to the philosophers to decide whether there can
ever be congruence between ethics and practical legislation. For those
of us who toil in the land use vineyards, the theory is irrelevant; we are
required to act ethically and achieve practical legislation—whatever
that means and however it is accomplished.
The concept of “ethics” cuts a broad swath. In the land use
field, ethics is typically viewed as dealing with the kind of conflicts of
interest that can arise between lawyers and their clients; between
multiple clients of a single lawyer; or about how intimately planners
and/or government officials can get involved with a project that will
come before them for some sort of review.2
That's all well and good. But the general texts and continuing
education courses on ethics are filled with illustrations of how to act in
those situations 3 (that is, for those who need education beyond the kind
of stuff contained in Robert Fulghum's classic work).4 There may be
more to the issue than how to act in narrow circumstances. For one
thing, there is the idea that government and the governed need to deal
with each other on a level playing field. As one court put it:
1

GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason in Society, in THE LIFE OF REASON, Vol. V, 262
(1905-06).
2
For example, at the most recent American Bar Association Land Use Institute, the
panel on ethics dealt with “the problems of conflict of interest, bias, ex parte
communication, social media, and other situations that attorneys and planners may
have to confront.” Same for the latest American Law Institute Continuing Legal
Education program on Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation. Spoiler
alert: although the materials are excellent, and the speakers worth listening to via
recordings after the fact, none of the speakers dealt with the ethical issues discussed
in this article, with the exception of a couple of references to biased councilmembers
as discussed post, text accompanying note 51 et seq.
3
A good illustration is PATRICIA E. SALKIN, Legal Ethics and Land Use Planning,
in HOT TOPICS IN LAND USE LAW CONTROL, 116 (2019).
4
ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED IN KINDERGARTEN
(1986).
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It has been aptly said: “If we say with Mr. Justice
Holmes, ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal
with the Government,’ it is hard to see why the
government should not be held to a like standard of
rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.” 5
Moreover, there are some peculiarly land use related questions that
have a core of ethical content and that receive too little attention as
ethical issues. For example, as the U.S. Supreme Court once put it, in
explaining the need for just compensation when private property is
taken for public use:
[t]he political ethics reflected in the Fifth Amendment
reject confiscation as a measure of justice. 6
So, there is at least one parameter: ethics is a part of the Fifth
Amendment, and it prohibits “confiscation” of private property. That
seems a good place to start. This article will highlight a few of the
larger ethical issues stemming from that beginning.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP

Let’s start with the Constitution. It contains a clear command
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.7 And courts frequently have noted the need to temper
otherwise rigid rules with concepts of fairness and equity in order to
comply with the proper treatment of property owners.
The constitutional requirement of just compensation
derives as much content from the basic equitable
principles of fairness, as it does from technical concepts
of property law.8
5

Crumpler v. Bd. of Admin. Emp. Ret. Sys., 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 579-80 (1973).
United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). For a classic law review discussion
of this topic, see generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citations omitted); Almota
Farmers E. & W. Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1973) (same); Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (principle of indemnification underlies just
compensation guarantee); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S.
121, 124 (1950) (“the word ‘just’ in the Fifth Amendment evokes ideas of ‘fairness’
and ‘equity’”); Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 303 (1970) (just compensation
6
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As an ethical issue, of course, the proscription of unfair takings of
private property pre-dates any of our constitutions. Multiple parts of
the Ten Commandments, for example, preclude both stealing and
coveting9—the latter presumably including a Jimmy Carter-esque
lusting in the heart after things that do not belong to the lustful.10 In
light of that command, how far is it ethical for government officials to
go in their dealings with property owners? The Constitution provides
a clue. The idea of the Constitution “was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.” 11 This is why “fundamental
guarantee designed to “socialize the burden” of public projects); S. Cal. Edison Co.
v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 175 (1975) (applying the Fuller holding and calling it a
“salutary principle”); Cnty. San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 691 (1975) (quoting
Fuller and changing California law to reflect a more equitable result); City of Los
Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 871 (1976) (condemnor acts in a “quasi-judicial”
capacity and owes duty of fairness to property owners. See also Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Management. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 596 (2013) (“Extortionate demands
for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause”).
But see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 333
(2002) in which the Supreme Court noted that any of seven aspects of “fairness and
justice” might have caused the Court to rule in the property owners’ favor, but it
decided not to employ any of them. For extended discussion, see Michael M. Berger,
Tahoe-Sierra: Much Ado About—What? 25 HAWAII L. REV. 295, 312-20 (2003).
For an analysis of judicial opinions paying no more than lip service to the “fairness”
rubric, see Gideon Kanner, “Fairness and Equity,” or Judicial Bait-and-Switch, 4
ALBANY GOVT. L. REV. 38 (2011).
9
See Deuteronomy 5:12-17 for the anti-coveting list.
10
If you doubt the application of this admonition to governmental property seizures,
see Ahab ex rel. Jezebel v. Naboth, 1 Kings 21:1-29, where regal theft received what
one might call Biblical retribution. For the proper way to handle things, compare
David v. Ornan, 1 Chronicles 21:22-25, where King David insisted on paying fair
compensation for property even though the owner offered to give it to the King, along
with animals for sacrifice. The underlying precedent for David appears in Genesis
23:16, where Abraham accepted the terms of Ephron the Hittite and paid for land “at
the going merchants’ rate.” Sounds like the concept of paying fair market value in
public land acquisitions goes back quite far.
11
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). At a
constitutional level, of course, it is good to remember that the Bill of Rights was
adopted to protect individuals against the government—the few against the many—
not the other way around. Id. As a former Chief Justice of California put it, “[t]he
provisions of [the Constitution] set forth a system of ‘enduring general values’, and
perhaps we can describe judicial review as ‘institutionalized self-control.’” Donald
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rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.”12 As the Supreme Court recently concluded, “[t]he
freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in one of its essential
dimensions, of the right of the individual not to be injured by the
unlawful exercise of governmental power.” 13
The interaction of ethics, morals, and law was aptly summarized thus:
The Federal Constitution is not a set of neutral
pronouncements. It is [a] structure of law implicit with
values: moral values, civic values, social values. It
takes sides—usually the side of the individual,
guarding his security, his dignity, his claims to equal
and fair treatment, against the ponderous demands of
the collective state.14
This issue comes up regularly. Most people, I suspect, tend to think of
these issues in terms of “law,” rather than “ethics,” but bear with me.
As Justice William O. Douglas put it, “The Constitution and the Bill
of Rights were designed to get Government off the backs of the people
. . . .”15 I think Justice Douglas had something more than dry legal
maxims in mind.
For example, think about “dedication” of property as a
condition to the issuance of a permit. Even though the Supreme Court
held thirty-five years ago in a case involving the California Coastal
Commission that some efforts to convince property owners to
“dedicate” land are nothing less than “extortion,”16 that harsh
condemnation of a standard government practice did not end matters.
Is extortion unethical? Should it be countenanced? If we all should
have learned at our mothers’ knees that extortion was beyond the pale,
shouldn’t there at least have been a slowdown in its regulatory practice
after the Nation’s highest court pointed out the emperor's lack of
clothing? If this ethical blast had any effect, why did the Supreme
Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1262, 1266 (1972).
12
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
13
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015) (quoting with approval).
14
Leonard M. Friedman, The Courts and Social Policy, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 558, 563
(1972).
15
NAT HENTOFF, LIVING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1998) (quoting William O. Douglas,
Letter to the Young Lawyers Section of the Washington State Bar Association.).
16
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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Court have to take up the issue again a few years later in Dolan v. City
of Tigard17 and further expand on governmental obligations?18
And what about the earlier victims of the California Coastal
Commission’s “extortion” who did not have the good fortune to have
the Supreme Court grant review in their cases and call out the
Commission for the extortionist it was finally labelled in Nollan? Did
it occur to the Commission to contact its earlier victims and offer to
return their property, or at least pay for it? Of course not. Having been
tarred with that criminal brush, it evidently never occurred to the
Commission to revoke any of the extortionate “gifts” it had extracted
over the years. Nor did it stop the Commission from seeking to enforce
those donations from property owners who, unlike the Nollans, lacked
the foresight or stamina to challenge them. They were met with the
standard defense ploy that the requests for judicial assistance came too
late.19 Morality, anyone? Ethical practice? The biggest role model
around is the government. When it acts morally, it sends a message.
Likewise, when it throws its weight around, bullying private citizens,
it also sends a message. The latter message is that brute power is the
key to proper action. Is that really the ethical thing to teach?
At the margin, of course, is a gray area that shifts back and forth
between bribery and extortion. Here's what I mean. When government
has a developer in the classic fish-in-the-barrel posture of needing
permits to complete a project so that lenders don't foreclose, and then
demands the financing of pet municipal projects as a condition of
permit approval (popular, but unfunded or underfunded projects like
17

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Aside from the obvious fact that the Court may have been enamored of the rhyming
possibilities of a Nollan/Dolan rule. If you will forgive a personal memory, see
Michael M. Berger, Nollan Meets Dolan Rollin’ Down the Bikepath, 46 LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIG., 1, 3 (1994).
19
E.g., Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State of Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 656 (1989);
Serra Canyon Co., Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 120 Cal. App. 4th 663, 669 (2004).
Whether a statute of limitations should ever be available to legalize governmental
theft is a different question for a different article. For an ethical lapse that shows
how far the federal government once tried to push the passage of time as a defense,
see Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1996). There, in a
“rails-to-trails” suit, where the owner of property underlying an abandoned railroad
easement tried to reclaim full title to the land (or at least obtain compensation
therefor), the government argued (presumably with a straight face) that the statute of
limitations had run out decades earlier in 1926, on the theory that all such claims
arose when Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1920, regardless of
when the easements were created. Fortunately, that ploy didn’t work.
18
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child-care, low-cost housing, public art, jogging tracks, job training,
bookmobiles, public transit, community symphonies, and the like), the
demand approaches the extortionate end of the scale. 20
In contrast, when municipalities severely restrict the number of
building permits they will issue, and then invite prospective developers
to participate in a “beauty contest” in which points are awarded for
various items of good (or, at least, desired) planning (including bonus
points for providing funding for those pet municipal projects, with
permits going to the projects with the highest bonus point totals), the
matter gets a bit hazy. One such contest was described as follows:
City Council evaluates competing projects and awards
points based upon its consideration of nine primary
criteria and fifteen secondary criteria. Some of the
criteria are: affordability, low-density, preservation of
natural terrain, provision of open space, proximity of
the project to public transportation and shopping
centers, mitigation of traffic problems, and construction
of infrastructure. The projects are then placed in a
queue that is based upon their ranking under a point
system. Only those projects placed into the queue are
eligible for building permits.21

20

This is not my first rodeo. I've been on this particular ethical rant for years. See,
e.g., Michael M. Berger, Real Estate Developers’ Linkage Fees: Reasonable
Requirement or Extortion?, 1 PROB. & PROP. 9, 9 (1987), which posed the question,
“[d]oes it set a good example for government—our omnipresent teacher by
example—to act in this fashion?” See generally Michael M. Berger, Nice Guys
Finish Last—At Least They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL.
WEST L. REV. 75 (1971); Michael M. Berger, The California Supreme Court—A
Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAL.
WEST. L. REV. 199 (1973); Michael M. Berger, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: A
License To Steal?, 49 CAL. ST. Bar J. 24 (1974); Michael M. Berger, Airport Noise
in the 1980s: It’s Time for Airport Operators to Acknowledge the Injury They Inflict
on Neighbors, in THE SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INST. On PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN, 10-4 (1987); Michael M. Berger,
Governmental Arrogance Gets the High Court’s Attention, 24 ENV’T L. 2 (1994);
Michael M. Berger, Do Planners Really Chafe at Being Fair?, 41 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3 (1989); Michael M. Berger, The State’s Police Power Is Not (Yet) the
Power of a Police State: A Reply to Professor Girard, 35 LAND USE L. & ZONING
DIG 4 (1983).
21
Griffin Homes Inc. v. Superior Court (City of Simi Valley), 280 Cal. Rptr. 792,
795 (1991).
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Depending on the developer’s natural bent or financial condition, this
one could shade in some cases toward the bribery side of the scale
(albeit the bribery is invited by the regulator). Or is it still extortionate?
Or a bit of each? Or is it just wordplay?22 Does it run afoul of Justice
Frankfurter’s admonition that the Constitution proscribes
“sophisticated as well as simple-minded” schemes for the invasion of
protected rights?23 In any event, where is the ethical answer? Former
American Planning Association president Fred Bosselman once
derided this mode of planning as “. . . ‘wait and see’ land-use
regulation in which restrictive regulations are adopted but then waived
or varied when a prospective developer makes an attractive offer
unrelated to the regulation.”24
Some people think this sort of police power leveraging is just
fine. They pretty it up by calling it “incentive zoning,” and describe it
this way:
Faced with mounting social needs and continuing fiscal
constraints, more and more cities ‘mint’ money through
their zoning codes to finance a wide array of public
amenities. Through the land use regulatory technique
formally known as ‘incentive zoning,’ cities grant
private real estate developers the legal right to
disregard zoning restrictions in return for their
voluntary agreement to provide urban design features
such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and social facilities
and services such as affordable housing, day care
centers, and job training.25
Speaking of wordplay, see the California Supreme Court’s decision in Cal. Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435 (2015). In that court’s view, the
requirement of either building or setting aside or otherwise financing low-income
housing as a condition to obtaining development permission was not an “exaction,”
so the California Supreme Court could simply ignore the United States Supreme
Court’s analysis in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013), saying they did not apply because the High Court’s
analysis in those three cases dealt only with “exactions” while this was merely a
“land use regulation.” 61 Cal. 4th at 994.
23
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
24
Fred Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, The Current Status of Development Exactions,
14 FLA. ENV'T & URB. ISSUES 8, 9 (1987).
25
See generally Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game?
Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 Wash. U.J. URB. &
22
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Justice Scalia (along with four of his colleagues) expressed doubt
about the wisdom of allowing municipalities such power, noting the
ease with which it could be abused:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of
leveraging of the police power is allowed would
produce stringent land-use regulations which the State
then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to
lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly
sought to be served that would result from more lenient
(but nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the
importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition
not only does not justify the imposition of unrelated
conditions for eliminating the prohibition, but
positively militates against the practice. 26
Need an illustration of how this can get out of hand? The City of
Patterson, California required builders of homes to assist lower income
families to buy homes by including some “affordable housing” in their
projects.27 As with many such regulations, this one allowed each
developer to buy out of the requirement for a fee (some might call it
ransom) of $734 per house (that the city promised to use to build
affordable housing elsewhere). 28 That fee could be raised, but only if
the increase was “reasonably justified.”29 Three years later, the city
increased the fee—to $20,946 per house. 30 With a straight face, the
city claimed that monstrous increase was “reasonably justified.” 31

CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991) (emphasis added). See also Anthony Guardino, Incentive
Zoning Can Help Alleviate Municipal Budget Woes, 264 N.Y. L.J. 102 (Nov. 24,
2020).
26
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987).
27
Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of Patterson, 171 Cal. App. 4th 886, 899 (2009),
disapproved on other grounds in California Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of San Jose,
61 Cal. 4th 435, 479 (2015).
28
Id. at 893.
29
Id. at 894.
30
Id. at 893.
31
Id. at 895-96.
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Even in California (and California courts have not been notably
sympathetic toward land developers 32) that wouldn’t fly.33
In fact, the term “incentive zoning” has a decidedly Orwellian
feel to it. It takes words that have a recognized (and neutral) meaning
and sets them up as something to justify more menacing governmental
action. The Supreme Court discussed this concept again in Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.34 Relying on the “unconstitutional
conditions doctrine,” which forbids government from granting a
benefit on condition of giving up a constitutional right, the Court
explained that Nollan and Dolan protect property owners’ Fifth
Amendment rights against over-zealous permit authorities:
[L]and-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable
to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits because the government
often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth
far more than property it would like to take. By
conditioning a building permit on the owner's deeding
over a public right-of-way, for example, the
government can pressure an owner into voluntarily

Calling California a “bizarre jurisdiction” in which a property owner would have
to be a “madman” to litigate, two nationally known land use experts concluded in
mock (or was it real?) sarcasm, rather than wasting time litigating, “it would cost a
lot less and save much time if [a developer] simply slit his throat.” RICHARD
BABCOCK & CHARLES SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 253-257, 293 (1985).
For a collection of similar conclusions by commentators from around the country,
see Gideon Kanner & Michael M. Berger, The Nasty, Brutish, and Short Life of Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 50 URB. L. 1, 16-18 (2019).
33
Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of Patterson, 171 Cal. App. 4th 886, 899 (2009). For
more extended analysis of the case, see Michael M. Berger, Appellate Advice on
What is NOT a “Reasonable In-Lieu Fee,” REAL EST. FIN. J. 114 (Winter 2010). See
also All for Responsible Plan. v. Taylor, 63 Cal. App. 5th 1072 (2021), where an
initiative measure sought to make any new development responsible for bringing all
nearby roads up to snuff, as a pre-condition even to filing an application and
regardless of how much the new development might contribute to road use problems.
Invoking Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, the court held that such a requirement was
invalid. Id. at 1085. As the court concluded, “judicial deference to the electoral
process does not compel judicial apathy towards patently invalid legislative acts.”
Id. at 1084.
34
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604-05 (2013).
32
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giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment
would otherwise require just compensation. 35
In short, “[e]xtortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits them.”36 Building on Nollan, the Court
concluded that it could not permit the improper “leveraging” of the
police power in this fashion 37 because the Court remained “[m]indful
of the special vulnerability of land use permit applicants to extortionate
demands for money . . . .”38
This sort of misuse of ordinary English words, corrupting them
to mean something plainly different from what they appear to mean,
ought not be countenanced. 39 As Justice Holmes memorably put it,
“fiction always is a poor ground for changing substantial rights.” 40
35

Id. In recent years, municipal governments have considered imposing linkage fees
for such things as jogging tracks, public transportation, low-income housing, day
care centers, and public art. Some courts have viewed the relationship as so tenuous
between the project for which a permit is sought and the fees demanded that they
have described the governmental conduct as “grand theft” (Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) and “extortion” (J.E.D. Assocs., Inc.
v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
36
Koontz, 570 U.S. at 605. To emphasize its concern over the government’s conduct,
the opinion uses some form of the word “extort” five times.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 619.
39
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (discussing that the
rights of property owners need to be protected by the judiciary against the “cleverness
and imagination” of governmental word games.); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992) (aff’g as the Supreme Court put it a few
years later, any government agency that cannot come up with a rational sounding
explanation for what it wants to do simply has “a stupid staff.”); see Michael M.
Berger, Is An ‘Innovative Scheme’ A New Label For Confiscating Private Property?,
51 L.A. B.J. 222 (1975) (showing how words have meaning and that using them
correctly is important goes back many centuries); see RICHARD WILHELM,
CONFUCIUS AND CONFUCIANISM 50-51 (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.1972 ed.,
George H. Danton at al. trans., 2005) (1931) (responding to a question from the
Prince of Wei, Confucius proclaimed that the most important function of government
is to see that things are called by their proper names, because otherwise chaos and
anarchy rule).
40
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 630 (1906) (The quote is from a dissenting
opinion that was eventually vindicated when Haddock was overruled.). As
California’s acclaimed Chief Justice Roger Traynor put it, sometimes even judicial
opinions contain ideas that have never been “cleaned and pressed and might
disintegrate if they were.” Roger Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49
CAL. L. REV. 615, 621 (1961).
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A nationally prominent planner/lawyer provided his own
personal recollections of such events:
[P]lanners . . . have provided regulatory incentives for
voluntary dedication, or, as most highly effective
planners do, they have taken the developers aside and
cajoled the ‘voluntary’ dedication out of them. I
remember one particularly effective planner who,
fifteen years ago, before affordable housing programs
became popular, would take condominium developers
aside and tell them if they wanted their project
approved, they should offer to provide some affordable
units in their projects. Am I condoning random
extortion? Of course not, but much good can come
from a little backroom bartering. 41
But might it not merely be petty theft? Something to pay little attention
to? In some instances, the value of what is taken from each individual
might be said to be de minimis.42 Is that OK? Do we need to invoke
the majesty of the Constitution to deal with petty issues? As iconic a
figure as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once referred to minor
governmental incursions as “the petty larceny of the police power” (as
opposed to grander larceny that calls for different treatment) in the
draft of an opinion for the Supreme Court, but others convinced him to
delete the phrase from the final version. He was fond enough of the
concept, however, to reprise it in his celebrated correspondence with
Harold Laski.43 More recently, Justice Stevens commented that “The
Fifth Amendment draws no distinction between grand larceny and

41

DWIGHT MERRIAM, A PLANNER'S VIEW OF DOLAN, IN TAKINGS: LANDDEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS
214 (David Callies ed., 1996).
42
See Jason L. Riley, San Francisco Has Become a Shoplifter’s Paradise, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 19, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/san-francisco-shoplifters-theftwalgreens-decriminalized-11634678239 (discussing how, in the argot of our times,
shoplifting less than $1,000 of merchandise has been reduced in places like San
Francisco to less than a misdemeanor. Indeed, store clerks and law enforcement
officials don’t even bother stopping such minor criminal activity. This has led a
significant number of chain stores to simply close some of their more sensitive
locations.).
43
See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 22, 1922), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916-1935, 457 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1953).
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petty larceny.”44 Does that change matters either legally or ethically?
Consider, in this light, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.?45 There, the New York legislature sought to compel apartment
owners to accept cable TV equipment to service their tenants. The
State thought the invasion was minimal and the presumed
compensation could be set at a single, paltry dollar. The Supreme
Court wouldn't bite. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall, the
Court said it didn't matter “. . . whether the installation is . . . bigger
than a breadbox,”46 because “constitutional protection for the rights of
private property cannot be made to depend on . . . size . . . .”47 The
Supreme Court had to return to this issue recently in a case involving
what some saw as minimal intrusion on farm property by labor union
organizers who wanted to communicate with unrepresented workers.
The Court was unconcerned about the value of the intrusion or the
length of the union organizers’ intrusion,48 concluding flatly that the
constitution bars all takings, regardless of size or extent. 49
Is theft ethical? No. Is it constitutional? No. Does it continue?
Of course. Do government officials like being reminded that they are
engaging in theft? Don't be absurd.50
44

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 727 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
458 U.S. at 419.
46
Id. at 438 n.16 (Younger readers can ask their parents about the origin of this phrase
and why the older Supreme Court justices would have been familiar with it.).
47
Id. at 436 (showing how, in a similar vein, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
refused to permit Congress to eliminate and escheat Native American land titles, even
though the individual values involved were as little as $12.30); see generally Babbitt
v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 234 (1997); see also Hodel, 481 U.S. at 723.
48
The Ninth Circuit found no taking because the occupation was not total. See Cedar
Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524, 532 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding as the State
defendant had urged, that there could not be a taking in these circumstances unless
the regulation allowed intrusion 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year).
49
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2074 (2021).
50
Contra Steven Greenhut, Bruce’s Beach Spotlights Importance of Property Rights,
PRESS ENTER. (Oct. 21, 2021, 3:19 PM), https://www.pe.com/2021/10/21/brucesbeach-spotlights-importance-of-property-rights/ (discussing the misuse of eminent
domain to remove a Black family from a California beach community, which latterday officials have acknowledged as theft and returned the property to the former
owners’ heirs); see Clara Harter, City opens applications for Right to Return
program, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS (Jan. 18, 2022, 6:00 AM),
https://www.smdp.com/city-opens-applications-for-right-to-return-pilotprogram/212430 (discussing how Santa Monica, CA announced a somewhat more
modest program. Although referred to as a “form of reparations,” it is quite a bit
less. For the estimated 2,000 to 2,500 families displaced from the city’s downtown
for freeway expansion and a new city hall, the city proposes to allow 100 families
45
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"BOYS WILL BE BOYS"—AND SOMETIMES THEY CREATE
HAVOC

Bias has always seemed a strange duck in the land use field.
Here's the root cause of the problem (to use the favored nomenclature
of today’s Washington insiders): the field is inherently political; it is
run by elected officials. And they often run for office on platforms
directly related to land use issues that will come before them for
decision once the heat of electioneering is done with.
I'm using “bias” in its broadest sense, as connoting a feeling
toward or against a particular property owner or particular land uses or
use of some specific land. Sometimes, people who are biased think
they are merely being virtuous, as they are trying to do the “right”
thing. But that is not the issue:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill
of Rights in general, and of the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
who can prove displacement to have access to below market homes); Liam Dillon,
Santa Monica’s Message to People Evicted Long Ago for the 10 Freeway: Come
Home, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/homelesshousing/story/2021-12-26/santa-monica-to-people-long-evicted-by-freeway-comeback-home (“civic penance”); see Erica Werner & Troy McMullen, Advocates Push
Nationwide Movement for Land Return to Blacks After Victory in California, WASH.
POST
(Dec.
6,
2021,
12:45
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/12/06/return-black-owned-landmovement/ (discussing an updated effort to expand this sort of land return
nationwide. They are hardly the only family abused by eminent domain, nor is the
abuse limited by race.); see generally DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE
GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (2003) (providing numerous examples of families abused by eminent
domain); DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE
IN THE POST-KELO WORLD (2006); Henry W. McGee, Jr., Urban Renewal in the
Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 VA. L. REV. 826 (1970); Chester W. Hartman,
Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745 (1971); Charles M.
Sevilla, Asphalt Through the Model Cities: A Study of Highways and the Urban
Poor, 49 URB. L. 297 (1971); Eric Felten, Kiss Your House Good-Bye, READER’S
DIGEST, 135 (Mar. 2001).
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characterize praiseworthy government officials no less,
and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.51
Thus, decisions are sometimes the result of the demands of wellmeaning but politically-motivated and result-oriented officials who,
lest we forget, sometimes pursue the demands of influential private
interests, not necessarily the public good—a situation that has become
all too common.52 But when government actions are being influenced
by personal feelings, where is the ethical line drawn?
A.

Case Study #1: Political Campaign Against a
Particular Project

This is one of the country’s classic, landmark cases: City of
Fairfield v. Superior Court. 53 By a 3-2 vote, the city council turned
down a development application for a shopping center. So far, nothing
unusual. It happens all the time.
Before the city council meeting, however (i.e., before evidence
was produced and the matter argued), the Mayor had announced his
opposition to the project. Another member of the council had appeared
before the planning commission to oppose the project and had made
opposition to the project part of his campaign for election to the city
council. Both refused to disqualify themselves and both were part of
the 3-person majority. The developer sued, claiming that bias had been
the root of his defeat.
The issue before the California Supreme Court arose in the
context of discovery. The developer set depositions of both biased
councilmembers at which he sought to inquire about when they made
up their minds how they were going to vote, whether they discussed
the matter with other individuals before the vote, whether they
promised any group that they would vote against the project and
whether they told anyone that they had closed minds about the project
before the final city council hearing. Not surprisingly, they refused to
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 (“It
is a separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates
property rights that compensation must be paid”); see Lingle v. Chevron, Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (“[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has
acted pursuant to a valid public purpose.”).
52
See generally RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES
AND POLICIES (1966); BERNARD J. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
HUSTLE (1979).
53
City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 768 (1975).
51
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answer. In refusing to allow the questioning to go forward, the
Supreme Court’s response was direct:
[E]ven if Commercial could prove that Campos and
Jenkins had stated their views before the hearing, that
fact would not disqualify them from voting on the
application.54
Another way of stating the court’s response is it’s just the political
process.55 So it's legal. However, as one planning expert expressed it
“the real culprit in the quagmire of modern land use regulatory law is
the ‘anything goes’ standard of judicial review behind which local
governments that do not adhere to the minimal constraints of the
Constitution can hide . . .”56 But, if ethics exists on a different plane
than law, is it ethical for those who make the decisions to make up their
minds in advance or to seek office on the basis of opposition to a
specific project?
B.

Case Study #2: City Council as Litigant and Judge

Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks57 presented facts that were
hard for even a pro-government court to countenance. After 15 years
of trying, the property owners finally obtained permission from the city
planning commission to develop their 47 acres into residential units.58
It was subject to 500 (not a typo, five hundred) conditions but,
nonetheless, the stamp on the application said “approved.” Under the
city's ordinances, that decision was final unless someone appealed it to
the city council. 59 No one appealed. But a number of citizens
complained ex parte to city council members about the project and its
impacts—so the city council appealed the permit to itself and then
54

Id. at 779.
See generally Emily Crane, Biden: Sen. Sinema Harassment Over Infrastructure
Vote is ‘Part of the Process’, N.Y. POST (Oct. 4, 2021, 2:19 PM),
https://nypost.com/2021/10/04/biden-says-harassment-of-sen-kyrsten-sinema-ispart-of-the-process/ (discussing President Biden’s comment that, when protesters
followed a United States Senator into the ladies’ room and berated her while she was
occupied in one of the stalls, it was just part of the political “process”).
56
Charles L. Siemon, The Paradox of “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan”
and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial Review
of Land Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REV. 603, 605-06 (1987).
57
Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks, 30 Cal. App. 4th 547, 547 (1994).
58
Id. at 552.
59
Id.
55
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purported to hold a hearing on its own appeal after which it agreed (as
judge) with its position (as appellant)!
Peeved, the property owners sued. The trial court found that
the city council had violated its own rules in hearing the “appeal”
because there was no written notice of appeal by anyone, there was no
urgency that would have permitted the city council to waive any
applicable rules, and the city council was not a “person” (within the
meaning of the city's code) that could file an appeal. Nonetheless, the
trial court upheld the city. Through some creative gymnastics, the trial
court decided that, if the city council had not appealed to itself, one of
the irritated citizens in the audience would have done so. And if such
a person had done so, the city council would have reached the same
decision on his hypothetical appeal. 60 “Harmless” errors, so to
speak—even though not one of the hypotheses was true.
The Court of Appeal reversed. Acknowledging the Fairfield
rule discussed above, the court nonetheless concluded that property
owners are entitled to some modicum of fairness, something that did
not happen here. When “the ‘appellant’ (Council) at the hearing did
not specify exactly what action it was asking the Council (as
decisionmaker) to take . . . the hearing became somewhat of a free-forall . . . .”61 Thus:
The problem which respondents refuse to accept is that
the Council acted in an arbitrary and high-handed
manner. The Council ignored procedural due process
and claims ‘no harm, no foul’ because there was a
hearing. True, a councilperson has a right to state views
or concerns on matters of community policy without
having his vote impeached. Additionally, opposition of
neighbors to a development project is a legitimate
factor in legislative decisionmaking. . . . We agree that
a trier of fact does not have to be completely indifferent
to the general subject matter of the claim presented to
be impartial. Nonetheless, a fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process. A biased
Rather like Lord Dundreary’s conundrum in Our American Cousin, the play
President Lincoln was watching on the last day of his life: “if you had a brother do
you think he’d like cheese?”. See TOM TAYLOR, OUR AMERICAN COUSIN (Project
Gutenberg eds., July 5, 2021), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3158/3158-h/3158h.htm.
61
Cohan, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 557.
60
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decisionmaker is constitutionally unacceptable. The
right to a fair procedure includes the right to impartial
adjudicators.62
A more recent decision also berated government officials for use of
their personal animus in deciding matters before them. In Woody’s
Group, Inc. v. City of Newport Beach,63 a restaurant owner sought to
overturn the city council’s reversal of a planning commission decision
in his favor. The Court of Appeal held that the city council “violated
at least two basic principles of fairness” in its action: first, the precept
that “you cannot be a judge in your own case” and second, that “you
cannot change the rules in the middle of the game.” 64 How did they
violate such rudimentary precepts that they should have learned on the
playground in elementary school?
One of the councilmembers had previously announced his
“strong opposition” to the project and then he took advantage of a quirk
in city law that allowed him to appeal the planning commission’s
decision to the very body on which he sat.65 When the matter came
before the city council, the “appellant” councilmember delivered a
long speech that he conceded had been written out before the hearing, 66
belying (as the court of appeal later noted) 67 his claim that he had no
bias. His preconceptions presented an unacceptable level of bias and
he should not have participated.
At bottom, the “appellant” ran afoul of the plain words of the
city’s own ordinance. The ordinance provided that an appeal from the
planning commission could be taken by any “interested” party. But,
by definition, the city council, when sitting as an appellate body, must
be populated by disinterested members. The appellant/councilmember

62

Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted) (supporting the premise that when a city council
acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, its members lose some of the flexibility they might
have when enacting general legislation. They are acting as judges and should be held
to a higher standard); see generally BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance, 81 Cal.
App. 4th 1205, 1234 (2000); Petrovich Dev. Co., LLC v. City of Sacramento, 48 Cal.
App. 5th 963, 963 (2020) (“in such matters council members must be neutral and
unbiased.”); see also Dellinger v. Lincoln County, 266 N.C. App. 275, 275 (2019).
63
Woody’s Group, Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 233 Cal. App. 4th 1012 (2015).
64
Id. at 1016.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1019.
67
Id. at 1022-23.
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could not be both interested and disinterested. 68 His “appeal” could
not stand.69
The Third Circuit also became wroth with councilmembers
acting in such a biased fashion:
[P]laintiffs are asserting that defendants, acting in their
capacity as officers of the Township, deliberately and
improperly interfered with the process by which the
Township issued permits, in order to block or delay the
issuance of plaintiffs' permits, and that defendants did
so for reasons unrelated to the merits of the application
for the permits. Such actions, if proven, are sufficient
to establish a substantive due process violation . . . . 70
Recently, the United States Supreme Court expressed similar thoughts.
In reviewing a New York statute that allowed tenants to claim deferral
of rent payment because of the current health/economic crisis—based
solely on an affidavit filed by the tenant making such a claim—the
Court responded simply, but sharply, “[t]his scheme violates the
Court’s longstanding teaching that ordinarily ‘no man can be a judge
in his own case,’ consistent with the Due Process Clause.” 71 The
tenant’s own self-serving statement could not be the end of the matter.
C.

Case Study #3: Delay as a Municipal Tool

Elihu Root once observed that the mark of a good lawyer was
the ability to tell an overreaching client that he was a damned fool and
to cut it out.72 Of course, it helps if you have a client who is willing to
listen. When the City Attorney of Spokane, Washington told his
68

Id. at 1017-18.
The California Coastal Commission carries the interested appellant concept even
further. Not only are members of the Commission entitled to appeal matters to
themselves (Cal. Pub. Res. Code §30625), the Commission has a “longstanding”
practice of having the Commissioners sign blank appeal forms that the staff fills out
on their behalf in order to “save the need to travel” to the Commissioners’ homes to
have the forms timely filled out. See generally Ronald A. Zumbrun, California
Coastal Commission’s Preapproved Appeals: Convenience or Constitutional
Concern?, THE SACRAMENTO DAILY RECORDER (Oct. 8, 2007). See also California
Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Water, staff report on SB 1295, 2
(“according to data obtained from the CCC, that practice is long-standing.”).
70
Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1995).
71
Chrysafis v. Marks, 141 S. Ct. 2482, 2482 (2021).
72
WISEFAMOUSQUOTES, http://wisefamousquotes.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
69
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municipal client to “cut it out,” the council members should have
listened. The upshot is reported in Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of
Spokane.73
Mission Springs wanted to develop a large apartment complex
on land it owned.74 Its proposed 790 units in 33 buildings was the
largest planned unit development in Spokane at the time, and it
generated its predictable share of controversy. 75 One of the problems
was vehicular access and the known increase in traffic that a project of
this size would generate. 76 Notwithstanding any potential problems,
the city approved the project in 1992, after public hearings at which
the issues were fully aired. 77 Under Washington law, that approval
gave Mission Springs a five-year vested right to build its project unless
the city council found that changed conditions presented a serious
threat to the public health or safety. 78 No such finding was ever
made.79
For reasons undisclosed in the opinion, grading for the project
was delayed, and Mission Springs applied for a new grading permit in
1994.80 Both the planning and legal staffs reviewed the application
and concluded that permit issuance would be routine, as all
requirements were met. But others were evidently at work behind the
scenes.81 The city council held a critical hearing on June 22, 1995. 82
Opponents of the project had been in contact with council members
and let it be known that they wanted to do something about the
project.83 They were at the meeting in force. Mission Springs, by
contrast, received no notice that anything of consequence would take
place and did not even attend the meeting. 84
At that fateful city council meeting, project opponents
expressed their concerns in tones that obviously got the attention of
their elected representatives. 85 When one of the council members
73

Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947 (1998).
Id. at 952.
75
Id. at 972.
76
Id. at 953.
77
Id. at 952.
78
Id. at 953.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 954.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 954-55.
84
Id. at 954.
85
Id. at 955.
74
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asked the city attorney “what would happen” if they simply stalled
issuance of the grading permits pending further study of the access
issue, the city attorney sought politely to turn the council from that
path.86 Not only was he correct in this case but, as he reminded the
council members, they had done this sort of thing to another property
owner recently, and he took them to court. 87 Here's the advice:“[w]hat
would happen is that it would be the genesis of a cause of action by the
developer against the city for unlawfully interfering with the issuance
of a building permit and that is essentially the same basis that we're
presently in federal court on, a civil rights violation.” 88
Notwithstanding the city attorney's repetition of his concerns
and reminders of past problems caused by this same kind of
interference in the permit issuing process, council members announced
that they thought it was a “great” idea to undermine the process.89 As
for Mission Springs, “let's just see what happens. Let's see how
confident they are.”90 As though no harm could be caused by delaying
the project, one councilman opined, “we can always turn around and
issue the permit . . . .” 91 The motion to stall the developer passed
unanimously.92
They had to have known better. Delay is almost always
harmful to developers. 93 They are on tight, often interlocking,
86

Id. at 955-56.
Id. at 955.
88
Id. at 955.
89
Id. at 956.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 956.
92
There are many ways that government entities can insert delay into the process, all
to the detriment of property owners. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp.
655 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (denying repair or improvement permits); City of Detroit v.
Cassese, 136 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. 1965) (encouraging tenants to leave); Klopping v.
City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39 (1972) (city dismissed condemnation action but
announced that it would re-institute it after it concluded some pending litigation
concerning a land acquisition bond issue).
93
See Gregory Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1, 98 (1995) (“[M]unicipalities may have an incentive to exacerbate
this problem [of the delay inherent in “ripening” a case], as stalling is often the
functional equivalent of winning on the merits”); JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY
MATTERS: HOW PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE UNDER ASSAULT – AND WHY YOU SHOULD
CARE 296-98 (1997) (“The name of this game is transaction costs . . . . [s]ubstantive
legal doctrines mean little if you cannot get into court in the first place.”). See, e.g.,
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39 (1972) (rent loss and foreclosure); Drakes
Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1970) (use restriction); Luber
87
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schedules involving contractors, sub-contractors, lenders, tenants, and
the like.94 For a city to jump in unexpectedly and inject unknown delay
into the construction schedule is something that could not go
unchallenged.
An urban planner, professor, and one-time member of the Los
Angeles City Planning Commission put it this way:
City planners also act irresponsibly, if not unethically,
when they recommend legislation or base city planning
decisions on ordinances which they favor, but which
they know will likely be overturned if appealed to the
courts. It is not uncommon for city and county
planners, with characteristic certainty that their ends
justify the means, to take advantage of the fact that it is
almost always too time-consuming and expensive for
private land developers to challenge laws and
administrative decisions in court, even if they are of
dubious legality.95
So Mission Springs sued, seeking relief under both state law and the
federal Civil Rights Act. 96 The latter, which provides a federal cause
of action for rights guaranteed by the federal constitution or federal
statutes, can be brought in either state or federal court and is becoming
a more frequently-used remedy by property owners. 97 It established

v. Milwaukee County, 177 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1970) (tenant loss); Richmond Elks
Hall Assn. v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (customer
loss); Jones v. People, 22 Cal. 3d 144 (1978) (access impairment); Conroy-Prugh
Glass Co. v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., 456 Pa. 384 (1974) (mortgage
foreclosure and tax sale).
94
Sadly, litigation over land use permits seems to go on forever, the modern-day
equivalent of Charles Dickens’ Bleak House. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (5 years, 5 planning submissions, 19 site plans—
all rejected; 18 years of litigation); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (It
took Mrs. Agins 30 years to finally receive permission to build four homes on her 5acre parcel); Charles Gallardo, After 29 Years, Tiburon House Going Up: Home
OK’d But Not For Original Owner, MARIN INDEP. J., B-6, (1997).
95
Melville Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 PUB. AD. REV. 1, 4 (1982).
96
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
97
See Michael M. Berger, The Civil Rights Act: An Alternative Remedy for Property
Owners Which Avoids Some of the Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional
“Takings” Litigation, 12 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 121-22 (1989).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/3

22

Berger: Theft, Extortion, and the Constitution: Land Use Practice Needs a

2022 LAND USE PRACTICE NEEDS AN ETHICAL INFUSION 777
what the Supreme Court calls a “constitutional tort,” 98 intended to
provide “broad and sweeping protection” 99 to all citizens—including
property owners.
Although the trial court entered summary judgment for the city,
the Supreme Court reversed. 100 The first step was to determine
whether Mission Springs had a property right that the city violated. 101
That part was easy. As noted earlier, once the city council had
approved the project in 1992, the developer had a five-year vested right
to complete its project. 102 The issuance of a grading permit was merely
a ministerial act that the city had no discretion to refuse.
Citing earlier decisions condemning municipal “stalling” and
“administrative procrastination,” the Court summed it up this way:
“Simply put, neither a grading permit, building permit, nor any other
ministerial permit may be withheld at the discretion of a local official
to allow time to undertake further study. The Spokane City Council
received well-founded legal advice from its City Attorney which it
chose to disregard.”103
The consequence of disregarding that advice was to render the
city liable for a civil rights violation. It is plain from reading the
Supreme Court's analysis that the only open issue the Court saw on
remand would be the amount of damage suffered by Mission
Springs.104 The cause of action was firmly established, because
persons acting under color of state law (i.e., the city council members
purporting to exercise municipal police power) denied Mission Springs
rights (i.e., the issuance of a permit to which it was entitled) protected
by federal law (i.e., the part of the Fifth Amendment that precludes the
deprivation of property without due process of law).105

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972).
100
134 Wash. 2d at 972.
101
Id. at 960.
102
Id. at 953.
103
See Mission Springs, 954 P.2d at 256. As one court classically put it, “[i]t is not
for nothing that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have to do with matters
of procedure. Procedure is the fair, orderly, and deliberate method by which matters
are litigated.” Estate of Buchman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 560 (1954). See also
Pokoik v. Silsdorf, 358 N.E.2d 874, 876 (N.Y. 1976) (dilatory governmental tactics
were “supportable neither by law nor by sound and ethical practice.”).
104
Id. at 972.
105
Id. at 964-65.
98
99
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The facts also might have supported a claim that the property
had been temporarily taken while the permit was withheld. 106 After
all, what the city did was to take property (the ability to develop
without delay) that belonged to Mission Springs and freeze it in time.
While the city held that development right in limbo, it was plainly
taken from the property owner. Mission Springs, however, did not
plead a temporary taking.107
Thus, the Court distinguished a takings claim from the due
process claim before it. “The talisman of a taking is government action
which forces some private persons alone to shoulder affirmative public
burdens, ‘which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.’”108 This philosophy of fairness, balance, and
proportionality—a measurement of means against ends—has long
been at the core of takings jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court and
other appellate courts have frequently analyzed property owners’
constitutional claims against that template. As expressed by the
federal appellate court most in tune with takings law (as it reviews all
takings judgments against the federal government): “[i]n short, has the
Government acted in a responsible way, limiting the constraints on
property ownership to those necessary to achieve the public purpose,
and not allocating to some number of individuals, less than all, a
burden that should be borne by all?”109
Due process, contrasted with takings, deals with “deprivation
of property through arbitrary interference with that process lawfully
due.”110 Arbitrariness can be measured by the clarity of the duties
subverted by the government, or the inappropriateness of the
conditions attached to obtaining its favor.111
Turning to the due process issue, the Court first noted that it
was “ripe” for litigation.112 In property rights litigation, ripeness is the
first—and often the most difficult—hurdle for property owners. The
courts have created myriad tests that must be satisfied before such

106

See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 320-21 (1987).
107
930 Wash. 2d at 971.
108
See Mission Springs, 954 P.2d at 258.
109
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
110
See Mission Springs, 954 P.2d at 258.
111
E.g., Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1988).
112
134 Wash. 2d at 962.
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claims can be litigated. 113 Here, however, the Court followed a
substantial decisional line holding that due process denials are ripe
immediately, because the constitutional harm occurs at the moment the
violation occurs.114 In other words, once the city council prevented
issuance of the grading permit, that action could not be undone; the
only questions were the length of time it would remain in effect and
the amount of damage it would cause before it was withdrawn.
The Court then had no trouble finding a constitutional
violation.115 State planning law provides no time for city council
members to delay projects while they rethink approvals given years
earlier.116 Thus, the council's decision to interject itself into the
process was wholly arbitrary and without legal foundation. It was a
purposeful abrogation of a mandatory process that—but for the
council's interference—would have resulted in immediate permit
issuance.
Moreover, the action was not the sort of broad-based legislative
action that city councils have the discretion and authority to enact and
to which courts generally defer. This was specific action directed at
only one property and one citizen. Such action is subjected to a higher
degree of scrutiny to determine whether it passes constitutional muster.
In the end, although basing its holding on the objectively observable
actions of the city council and their impact on Mission Springs, the
Court could not help but return to the city attorney's role and note that
“the irrationality is further dramatized by the overt rejection of advice
from the City's own attorney in favor of a defiant course of action . . .
.”117

113

For extended discussion see Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are
We Still Forced to Play? 30 TOURO L. REV. 297 (2014). Since that summary was
written, the Supreme Court seemed to get the message. In Knick v. Township of
Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), the Court eliminated the worst prong of the doctrine,
i.e., the rule that a property owner had to sue—and lose—in state court before a
federal claim was ripe. Id. at 2167-68. Then, in Pakdel v. City & County of San
Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226 (2021), the Court weakened the finality prong by holding
that it presented only a “low threshold” that could be satisfied by showing that the
regulatory body had reached an authoritative decision. Id.
114
134 Wash. 2d at 962-63.
115
Id. at 964-65.
116
Id. at 965.
117
Mission Springs, 954 P.2d at 261. See also South Grande View Dev. Co., Inc. v.
City of Alabaster, 1 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2021) (discussing ordinance that unfairly
targeted one property owner).
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Case Study #4: Animus Run Rampant

In Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino,118
the jury was offended by the treatment meted out by the city. It found
the city's actions were without legitimate basis and found damages in
excess of $11,500,000.119 Then the judges took over. The trial judge
granted the city's motion for new trial on the issue of the amount of the
damages, and the Court of Appeal took away even that prospect by
concluding—as a matter of law, evidently—that the city had done no
wrong.120 If (arguendo) what they did was legal, was it an ethical way
to treat this property owner? The jury surely thought not.
The case involved 29.3 acres of an initial holding of 600
121
acres.
That property was not inside the city when Stubblefield
bought it and began building homes on it in the 1960s.122 The city
wanted to annex the property. 123 Based on the city's promise of zoning
that would permit the continuation of construction in accordance with
the existing plans, Stubblefield agreed. 124 The evidence showed that
the city knew Stubblefield would rely on its assurances and intended
that he do so.125
The city’s policy was to review development proposals
according to the local rules, ordinances, and procedures in effect at the
time the plans were submitted. 126 This policy was explained to
Stubblefield a number of times.127 At some point, the city councilman
representing the district including the Stubblefield property became
what the Court of Appeal called a “powerful opponent” of
Stubblefield's development plans. 128 Much of the case was based on
the actions of this councilman (both publicly and behind the scenes) to
scuttle the project.

118

Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino, 32 Cal. App. 4th 687
(1995).
119
Id. at 695.
120
Id. at 715.
121
Id. at 693, 696.
122
Id. at 696.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 697.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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The first thing done was to amend the zoning ordinance
applicable to the Stubblefield property. 129 If the new zoning applied,
it would shrink the height of permitted buildings and subject
Stubblefield to the additional requirement of obtaining a conditional
use permit—a discretionary determination by the city, in contrast to
the ministerial issuance of building permits. Mr. Stubblefield was
assured that the new zoning would not apply to his project, as it was
already in process.130 But the “powerful opponent” on the city council
had other ideas. He proposed an urgency ordinance (which was
adopted) to change city policy, making the new zoning applicable. 131
The only “urgency” suggested for adopting this measure was to block
approval of the Stubblefield project. 132
Then the environmental review process—a sure creator of
delay—was invoked.133
Because the pending project was a
continuation of plans long known by and acquiesced in by the city, the
planning commission believed that a negative declaration (i.e., a
determination that no significant environmental impact would be
caused by the project) could be used in place of a full-blown
environmental impact report (EIR). 134 The city council, however,
prodded by the “powerful opponent” in its midst, voted 4-3 to require

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id. at 697-98.
132
Id. at 698.
133
For any who doubt the relationship between environmental review and project
delay, consider that the California Legislature, in an effort to increase the supply of
housing (especially low-income housing), agreed to simplify and speed up the
environmental review process for new housing developments. See Press Release, In
San Jose, Governor Newsom Signs Legislation to Fast-Track Key Housing,
Economic Development Projects in California, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR (May 20,
2021),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2021/05/20/in-san-jose-governor-newsom-signslegislation-to-fast-track-key-housing-economic-development-projects-incalifornia/. In a perverse twist on the environmental issue, some statutes are used to
protect “endangered” species which are in no danger whatever. Indeed, certain times
of the year are set aside during which the State sells licenses to kill these species
whose habitats are protected during the rest of the year. For illustrative litigation
involving such species, see, e.g., Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d
83 (2d Cir. 1992) (deer); Moerman v. State, 17 Cal. App. 4th 452 (tule elk);
Killington Ltd. v. State of Vermont, 668 A.2d 1278 (Vt. 1995) (brown bear).
134
32 Cal. App. 4th at 698.
130
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an EIR.135 The effect of the EIR requirement was to delay approval of
the project until after the new zoning took effect. 136
Stubblefield then asked that his project be “grandfathered” so
that it could proceed under the terms of the earlier ordinances. 137 The
city delayed action on that request. 138 Additional roadblocks and
delays accumulated. As noted, the jury was offended.139 It could find
no justification for the city’s actions and found significant damage had
been inflicted on Stubblefield. 140
The Court of Appeal reversed. 141 It apparently saw nothing
more than politics as usual, a sort of “boys will be boys” attitude. In
the court's words:
In our view, plaintiffs have not, as a matter of law,
shown arbitrary or irrational government action.
Rather, the record demonstrates actions . . . that
responded to concerns of constituents . . . and other
political concerns. . . It is not uncommon or unusual for
a legislator to oppose a project and to use all means
within his or her power to defeat it. After all, a
legislator is supposed to respond to the concerns of his
or her constituents . . . . Whether their concerns were
proper or justified is not the issue here. The point is
that their elected representative decided to oppose the
project, and did so vigorously.142
With respect, that is a startling statement. Indeed, it is little less than
endorsement of a state of nature: government by knife fight, or tooth

135

Id.
Id.
137
Id. at 699.
138
Id.
139
This is simply an illustration of my personal observation that property owners are
generally better off trying their cases to juries rather than judges. Nothing personal,
but judges tend to get hardened by all of the various matters they listen to, day after
day. Juries, comprised of ordinary people who do not live their lives in courtrooms,
tend to have a more empathetic outlook. For a discussion of the importance of juries
in these matters, see Michael M. Berger, Whither Regulatory Takings, 51 URB. L.
171, 197-200 (2021).
140
32 Cal. App. 4th at 695.
141
Id. at 714.
142
Stubblefield, 32 Cal. App. 4th. at 710-11 (emphasis added).
136
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and claw.143 Isn’t one of the purposes of organized government to
restrain irrational decision-making by mob rule (or making the
protection of anyone’s individual rights subject to popular vote), rather
than to encourage it? Indeed, as noted above, another Court of Appeal
chastised a city council for “simply submitting to the roar of the
crowd” when it wrongly denied development permission.144 Yet
another Court of Appeal drew this “boys will be boys” politics
argument to its logical conclusion when it said, “[i]f public opinion by
itself could justify the denial of constitutional rights, then those rights
would be meaningless.”145
After that, things really went downhill. When it decided that
there was nothing more involved here than good ol’ politics, the court
had to disregard the evidence and the jury’s evaluation of it (along with
the trial judge's evaluation of the liability evidence). Even the Court
of Appeal had to concede that Stubblefield's case “was apparently
accepted by the jury” and that the evidence showed “the City officials
arbitrarily acted to prevent plaintiff from developing its property.” 146
Neither state nor federal law permits a city to arbitrarily target an
individual property owner for abuse, as the jury found happened
here.147 Indeed, a federal appeals court felt so strongly about this kind
of biased activity that it refused to allow similarly affected
councilmembers to invoke immunity for their actions:
If defendants, for reasons unrelated to an appropriate
governmental purpose, intentionally conspired to
impede the development of the Blanche Road project,
by ordering that Blanche Road’s applications be
reviewed with greater scrutiny in order to slow down
the development and by ordering that efforts be taken
to shut down the development, such an arbitrary abuse

143

There is a famous scene in Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid where one of the
gang members challenges Butch to a knife fight. Butch replies that they first need to
agree on the rules. As the challenger stood stupefied, wondering what that might
mean and complaining that “there are no rules in a knife fight!” Butch kicked him in
the groin, knocked him out, and the fight was over. Transcript of Film at 26, “Butch
Cassidy and the Sundance Kid.”
144
Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks, 30 Cal. App. 4th 547, 561 (1994).
145
Ross v. City of Yorba Linda, 1 Cal. App. 4th 954, 964 (1991) (emphasis added).
146
Stubblefield, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 696.
147
E.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335 (1981).
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of governmental power would clearly exceed the scope
of qualified immunity.148
Many years ago, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that
mob rule does not comport with the Constitution:
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every
free government beyond the control of the State. A
government which recognized no such rights, which
held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens
subject at all times to the absolute disposition and
unlimited control of even the most democratic
depository of power, is after all but a despotism. It is
true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you
choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism.149
So, the city's actions passed legal muster. But were they ethical?
IV.

“RUB-A-DUB-DUB, THREE MEN IN A TUB”

In the general realm of municipal mistreatment of property owners,
it is hard to beat the facts in the Lozman case.150 Mr. Lozman has his
counterparts in many cities. He is the kind of person who drives city
council members nuts. He appears at most city council meetings and
asks to be heard during the open discussion period. 151 Then he takes
148

Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 1995).
Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1875). All clauses of the Fifth
Amendment were designed to “limit the power of government, and particularly the
power of majorities.” Tonja Jacobi et al., Creating a Self-Stabilizing Constitution:
The Role of the Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 601, 616 (2015). As Professor
Chemerinsky eloquently put it, “The primary reason for having a Supreme Court
then, is to enforce the Constitution against the will of the majority.” ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 9 (2014).
150
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013). See its sequel, Lozman
v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
151
See Jeffrey Toobin, Fane Lozman Goes to the Supreme Court, Again, THE NEW
YORKER (Mar. 2, 2018) (https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/fanelozman-goes-to-the-supreme-court-again), describing how, during one of these open
discussion sessions, a Council member had police arrest, handcuff and take him to a
holding cell at the police station. For history, see the Wikipedia entry for Fane
Lozman. WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fane_Lozman (last visited Aug.
7, 2022). (“The Council members were in agreement that Lozman should be
‘intimidated’ and made to feel ‘unwarranted heat’”) See also Heidi Kitrosser,
Opinion analysis: With facts like these, (June 19, 2018, 10:38 AM)
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-with-facts-like-these/ (“The
149
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off on his pet peeve du jour.152 This particular citizen’s problem got
compounded because the city council was not only tired of listening to
him, but the city was also his landlord.153 He had a floating home in
its harbor, but do not call it a “houseboat.” There is a photo of Mr.
Lozman’s home attached to the Court’s opinion. 154 It doesn’t look
very boat-like. First, it is a boxy affair that actually looks like a house,
rather than a boat, with picture windows and French doors instead of
portholes. It has no raked (pointed) bow (to ease its way through the
water if one wanted it to move), no engine, no bilge pumps, no
navigation gear and more (or less, actually). When he fell behind in
his rent, some bright folks at city hall decided it would be a good idea
to evict him155 (and possibly get rid of him for good?). They took him
to state court via an unlawful detainer action 156—and lost when the
jury concluded that the city was engaging in improper retaliation rather
than a legitimate landlord/tenant dispute. 157 Stung by its loss, the city
got even craftier, deciding that, because the home was floating in its
harbor, the case actually involved a “vessel” and could be brought in
Federal Admiralty Court.158
The city thus invoked the federal admiralty jurisdiction that is
in rem (i.e., the property, not the property owner, is the named

city council held a closed-door meeting to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting
transcript reflects the councilmembers’ frustrations with Lozman. At one point,
councilmember Elizabeth Wade proposed that the members “intimidate” him’.”
152
Id. See also City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two Story
Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir.
2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 115 (2013) (noting that city lost eviction case because jury
believed that “Lozman’s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
the City’s attempt to terminate the lease”). Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 39 F.
Supp. 3d 1392, 1400 (S.D. Fl. 2014) (Lozman “routinely voiced those criticisms at
public meetings of the Riviera Beach City Council and the Riviera Beach
Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) between the years 2006–2013.” This
opinion describes numerous instances of City efforts to silence and intimidate Mr.
Lozman).
153
568 U.S. at 118.
154
Id. at 132.
155
Id. at 118.
156
See
the
Wikipedia
entry
for
Fane
Lozman.
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fane_Lozman (last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
157
See supra note 143.
158
568 U.S. at 118-19.
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defendant).159 The court had the defendant (i.e., the floating home)
“arrested” and towed.160 It took three U.S. marshals to “arrest” the
structure and tow it away. They towed this unseaworthy structure to
Miami—eighty miles away—losing pieces of it along the way.
Judgment eventually was entered for the city, which bought the
defendant at an execution sale.161 And then destroyed it.162 The lower
courts held that this intentionally unseaworthy floating home was a
“vessel” and ruled for the city. 163
However, the Supreme Court saw through the city’s ploy,
decided it did not want to open this can of worms for future
exploitation and held that there was no admiralty jurisdiction. 164 The
opinion makes for interesting reading, as the Court struggles to explain
why it is rejecting admiralty jurisdiction here. Among other things, it
reverted to nursery rhymes to demonstrate the absurdity of expanding
admiralty jurisdiction.165 Remember “rub-a-dub-dub, three men in a
tub”? The Court did, wanting no part of such a journey.166
So, how does Lozman fit here? It was a warning by the Court—
a shot across the bow, as it were—warning that the Court was getting
tired of government gamesmanship that treated property owners
without respect while clogging the courts in the process.167 The
159

See, e.g., City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two Story Vessel
Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d. 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011),
rev’d, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).
160
649 F.3d at 1264.
161
Id. at 1265.
162
568 U.S. at 120.
163
Bearing witness to the truism that some courts will buy any argument proffered
by the government. See City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, TwoStory Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2011).
164
568 U.S. at 130.
165
Id. at 120.
166
Had the city’s ingenuous theory survived judicial scrutiny, every houseboat in the
land would have become subject to regulation and inspection by the U.S. Coast
Guard—followed by federal court litigation. Just what the Coast Guard and the
judiciary needed!
167
Games continue, nonetheless. How about an agency of the federal government
urging in serious mien that a property owner should not even be allowed to appear
in court to challenge the government’s action without first paying a fine of
$686,443.53 (plus interest)? No one—except a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals (the most often reversed court in the country)—could swallow that. The
United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture,
569 U.S. 513, 529 (2013).
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conservative Justices were joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan. Plainly, the opinion contained a message that needs to be
heeded.
V.

BALANCING BUDGETS ON THE BACKS OF PROPERTY
OWNERS

In case you thought the federal government was immune from
the kind of excesses we have been examining, here is a decision from
the U.S. Supreme Court to disabuse you.
We must significantly increase production to reach our
budget target,” read the memo from the Attorney
General of the United States: “Failure to achieve the
$470 million projection would expose the Department's
forfeiture program to criticism and undermine
confidence in our budget projections. Every effort must
be made to increase forfeiture income . . . . 168
Increase the production of forfeiture income to meet a budget target?
Believe it or not, that is not the dialogue in some grade B movie. In a
sad commentary on law enforcement, that memo from the Attorney
General (hereinafter “AG”) probably played a determinative role in
both the genesis of the case and in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Good Real Property.
What the AG’s memo did was to demonstrate how a good idea
can be taken to its extremes and trashed by well-intentioned folks who
convince themselves they are doing good and upholding the law.
Although suspicions have been growing in other quarters, it has taken
quite a bit for the message to seep through to the rarified atmosphere
in which the Supreme Court operates. (Even with the memo—and its
confirmation of the abuse of the forfeiture law being made by the
government—the result in Good Real Property was only 5 to 4 against
the government.)169
The background facts are fairly simple. James Daniel Good
was the subject of a 1985 drug bust. 170 He was arrested at his home in
possession of controlled substances.171 Upon his plea of guilty, he
168

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 43 n.2 (1993).
Id.
170
Id. at 46.
171
Id.
169
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received jail time and probation. 172 He was also compelled to forfeit
the cash found on the premises when he was arrested. 173 Time passed.
Four and a half years, actually. 174 During that time, Mr. Good paid his
debt to society.175 He also left the country, leasing the house to others
during his absence. 176 Then the Government decided it wanted his
house too.177 The law subjects to forfeiture all real property used in
the commission or facilitation of a federal drug offense.178
The law authorizing forfeiture of property used to facilitate
drug offenses is draconian by design. After all, it is directed at obvious
bad guys: people who, by definition, have violated federal drug laws.
Thus, it adds property forfeiture to whatever the regular penalty is for
violating whatever federal drug law got the property owner in trouble
in the first place—at the option of the Feds (although usually with a bit
more promptness than four and a half years after the bust). 179
Regardless of any other facts, in the Good Real Property case, the Feds
decided they could obtain their forfeiture ex parte.180 After all, the
property owner had already been convicted of violating federal drug
laws years earlier and the forfeiture was an automatic add-on. A slamdunk, they thought. A gimme. And there was that matter of making
good on the AG’s budget projections.
The Supreme Court had some concerns. Acknowledging
everything the Government said, and even acknowledging that Mr.
Good may very well lose when he tries his case on its merits (“[t]he
question before us is the legality of the seizure, not the strength of the
Government's case”),181 the moderate-to-liberal wing of the Supreme
Court took this opportunity to expound on the importance of the rights
of property owners and the protection afforded them by the
Constitution. First, asked the Court, what was the deal with the ex
parte seizure of property four-and-a-half years after the criminal
conviction?182 After all, the property was no longer occupied by the
172

Id.
Id. at 46.
174
Id. at 47.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (2002).
179
19 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604.
180
510 U.S. at 47.
181
Id. at 62.
182
Id. at 53.
173
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criminal (or any criminals, as far as the record showed) and the
property owner was thousands of miles away doing no more than
collecting $900 a month in rent.183
“[R]eal property” wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court, with
just a dash of understatement and a soupcon of scorn, “cannot abscond
. . . .”184 Thus, there was no urgency to justify even thinking about
dispensing with a modicum of due process and providing the property
owner with notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizure.
Plainly, the Government had no particular need for the property itself.
The ex parte order did not order the government into possession.185 It
merely told the tenant to make rent payments to the U.S. Marshal
instead of to Mr. Good. 186 Part of that making good on budget
projections, I guess.
The intriguing thing about the case is that it gave Justice
Kennedy and those philosophically arrayed on his portside the
opportunity to explain the essential relationship between protecting the
rights of property owners (often viewed as a right-wing affectation)
and protecting the essential rights to life and liberty (the usual province
of the more politically woke). The subject is hardly new. As the Court
bluntly put it more than two decades earlier:
The dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one. Property does not have rights.
People have rights.
In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to
liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could
have meaning without the other. 187
The idea that it is the rights of the property owner which are protected
by the Constitution (rather than the more antiseptic idea of “property
rights”) is one that needs periodic repetition. Twenty years after
Lynch, it was time to do so again. “Good's right to maintain control
over his home,” said the Court, “and to be free from governmental
interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing
importance.”188 This philosophy of freedom from governmental
interference in the use of property permeates the opinion.
183

Id. at 54.
Id. at 57.
185
Id. at 49.
186
Id.
187
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
188
510 U.S. at 53-54.
184
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The government, in essence, argued that what was at stake was
not Mr. Good's right to maintain control over his home or, indeed, any
of the kinds of possessory interests that tend to raise one’s blood
pressure when subjected to bureaucratic duress. All that was at stake
was money. In the Government's view, all that it denied him by its
forfeiture order was $900 per month in rent—not his property.189 How
soon they forget. Every lawyer who ever took a first-year property
course should remember his or her professor explaining that property
is not a thing, but a group of rights. 190 Among them is the right to
exploit the physical entity which we loosely label “property.” 191 The
Supreme Court remembered. In granting protection to the right to
receive rent, the Court noted that the rent represented the “exploitable
economic value” of the home. 192
Nor did the Court want to leave it open for argument that only
property used as a home was entitled to this level of protection. One’s
home may be the modern legal equivalent of a castle, 193 but the
Constitution’s reach is broader: “[t]he constitutional limitations we
enforce in this case apply to real property in general, not simply to
residences. That said, the case before us well illustrates an essential
principle: Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property
rights.”194 The nature of a truism is that its essence is so obvious that
it could be found embroidered on a sampler. The Supreme Court's
“essential principle” partakes of that reality. There has never existed
189

Id. at 47.
The Supreme Court routinely resorts to this metaphor. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,
76 (1982); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831
(1987); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2076 (2021). It behooves
lawyers to adopt the Supreme Court’s mode of analysis.
191
See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021).
192
Not to mention that “mere” money is property that is constitutionally protected.
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 555 (1998). See also Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 155 (1980); Brown v. Legal Foundation
of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
570 U.S. 595, 613-14 (2013) (collecting cases).
193
See Michael M. Berger, Property, Democracy & the Constitution, 5 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 45, 60 n.78 (2016).
194
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
Moreover, as Justice Holmes expressed it, “[p]roperty is protected because such
protection answers a demand of human nature, and therefore takes the place of a
fight.” Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).
190
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on this planet a society in which individual freedom was highly valued
and protected but private property rights were not.195 Although
undeniably true, such sentiments about protecting the rights of
property owners have recently been identified as politically
incorrect.196 It was refreshing to see the Supreme Court again
elevating them to the status of “essential principle.” 197
And speaking of balancing the governmental budget on the
backs of random property owners, do not miss Althaus v. United
States.198 There, the Chief Land Acquisition Officer for the Voyageurs
National Park in Minnesota addressed a large group of landowners in
the acquisition area.199 He explained the acquisition process to them
and urged them to cooperate with the government. 200 So far, so good.
Then it went downhill, as he explained the incentive for cooperation.
Even though we know what your lands are worth, we
are going to try and get them for 30 cents on every
dollar that we feel they are worth. Of course, you don’t
have to accept this 30 cents on the dollar. We will let
you wait for a couple of years. If you don't take 30 cents
on the dollar right now, you wait for a couple of years.
After a couple of years if you won’t take 30 cents on
the dollar, we are going to condemn it. We will
195

See James W. Ely, Jr., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT (2008); Tom
Bethel,
The
Mother
of
All
Rights,
REASON
(Apr.
1994),
https://reason.com/1994/04/01/the-mother-of-all-rights (persuasively demonstrating
that the lack of freedom and the violence pervasive in parts of the Middle East are
causally connected to an absence of reliably enforced property rules); Gideon
Kanner, Do We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in Order to Fulfill
Their Unique Role?, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 434 n.4 (2009).
196
See, e.g., the following examples of what is referred to as “progressive” property,
a theory that appears to be devoted to upending property concepts as we have known
them for generations: Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William
Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 743 (2009); Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 601 (2015); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 6 (2000) (“If
property means ownership, and if ownership means power without obligation, then
we have created a framework for thinking about property that privileges a certain
form of life—the life of the owner.”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions
and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 162 (2016); Joseph
William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1299 (2014).
197
510 U.S. at 61.
198
Althaus v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 688 (1985).
199
Id. at 691.
200
Id.
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condemn your property. You know what that is going
to mean? That means that you are going to have to hire
an expensive lawyer from the city and he is going to
take one-third of what you get. Plus, you know who is
going to have to pay the court costs. You are. That is
in addition to these expensive lawyers. 201
Let’s just say that the court was not amused. 202
More recently, the Supreme Court resurrected the bundle of
sticks to find a taking when the California Agricultural Labor Relations
Board enacted a regulation allowing union organizers to trespass (as it
would have been in the absence of the regulation) on farms so they
could seek to persuade workers to join their union. 203 Finding that the
right to exclude is one of the most treasured sticks in the property
owner's bundle, the Court held the regulation to be a taking. 204
Which brings us back to the other principle involved in this
case: the AG's budget and the ethics of it all. This is hardly the first
property-confiscation-cum-drug-bust to make headlines. A bit earlier,
for example, a veritable army of evident ineptitude, recruited from the
ranks of the Los Angeles County Sheriff, the LAPD, the National
Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and even some of
Smoky the Bear’s confidants in the National Park Service, descended
201

Id. at 691-92 (emphasis added). Perhaps familiarity breeds disregard, but there is
an inscription on a wall in the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. which reads:
“[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Government lawyers are mandated to
seek justice, not necessarily victory. That is an ethical mandate as well. Sometimes
some of them acknowledge it. See Jonathan Brightbill & Peter McVeigh, Support
Grounded in Litigation Experience for Using the Fair Market Value Measure of Just
Compensation in Cases Involving the United States, 10 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP.
RTS. CONF. J. 417, 419-20 (2021) (“The United States does not ‘game’ its valuations.
. . . [L]aws enacted by Congress . . . serve in part to ensure fair treatment of
landowners.”).
202
See also Alliance for Responsible Planning v. Taylor, 63 Cal. App. 5th 1072
(2021), where a citizens’ initiative measure demanded that any new development
upgrade all streets in the general vicinity, regardless of the proposed project’s impact
on traffic. The measure was invalidated.
203
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
204
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021). For representative
illustrations of the concept, see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1011 (1984); Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,
66 (1979). For a critical analysis of some applications of this concept, see Michael
M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 48 (1985).
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on the 200-acre Malibu ranch of a reclusive soul named Donald Scott.
Believing Mr. Scott to be the proprietor of some sort of pot plantation
(allegedly espied by the naked eyes of a federal agent flying 1000 feet
above the ranch), this polyglot force stormed Mr. Scott's home in the
dead of night. Their stated purpose was to serve a search warrant.
Only in addition to the warrant, these commandoes had an appraisal
report on the Scott property showing it to be worth $5 million,
complete with marginal notations about comparable sales. 205
Whatever equipment SWAT teams and the like generally carry with
them, appraisal reports on the surrounding real estate probably are not
part of the standard-issue kit for drug busts. Or serving search
warrants. But the forfeiture statutes—which permit the enforcement
agency to keep the confiscated property—have altered the equation. 206
Thus, by the time the Good Real Property case reached the
Supreme Court, many of the concerns about this statutory scheme had
already surfaced. And then someone found that memo from the AG
about the necessity of increasing the “production” of forfeitures to
“reach our budget target.”207 That one obviously struck a nervous
chord. The Court quoted the AG’s admonition and then noted that
particularly careful judicial scrutiny is mandated “where the
Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
[case].”208 The idea of heightened scrutiny in cases when a
government agency puts its corporate hand into a property owner’s
pocket is a theme on which the Court has remarked before. 209
205

For the full story of the Scott tragedy, see Ron Soble, Death of a Tycoon: Killed
in Raid, Rancher Don Scott was a Man of Legends, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 1992, 12:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-10-11-me-257-story.html.
206
Others have remarked on the potential for evil in the abuse of these forfeiture
provisions. (E.g., Gideon Kanner, Life and Property: King Ahab Meets the United
States Constitution, LOS ANGELES DAILY J., Apr. 13, 1963, A6).
207
See supra note 159.
208
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 (1993).
209
U.S. Tr. Co. v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (deference to government not
appropriate where “the State’s self-interest is at stake. A governmental entity can
always find a use for extra money”); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,
896 (1996) (“statutes tainted by a governmental object of self-relief . . . [by] shift[ing]
the costs of meeting its legitimate public responsibilities to private parties”);
Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957, 1029 n.9 (1991) (“it makes sense to scrutinize
governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit”); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (“We are inclined to be particularly
careful . . . where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting
of a land use restriction . . . .”). In this context, it seems appropriate to note that
Professor James Buchanan received the Nobel Prize in Economics for demonstrating
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Viewing life on a cosmic plane, Donald Scott may not have
died in vain. One of the amicus briefs brought his story to the Supreme
Court's attention as part of the demonstration of how government
agents can run amok when massive dollar signs dangle tantalizingly
before their eyes. Professor Kanner's comments also appeared in The
Wall Street Journal210 and may have provided additional, albeit
indirect, information to the Court.
Everyone understands budget crises. But they cannot serve as
convenient excuses for ignoring constitutional protections of
individuals—even individuals who own property. Cavalier treatment
of such rights undermines the basis of our society. As Justice Brandeis
put it, “[t]he goose that lays golden eggs has been considered a most
valuable possession. But even more profitable is the privilege of taking
the golden eggs laid by somebody else’s goose.” 211
VI.

MEN IN BLACK OR BEWARE OF G-MEN “BORROWING”
YOUR PROPERTY

So, you are sitting there minding your own business (a vending
machine business, actually) when a couple of guys in dark suits and
shades walk in flashing FBI badges. They look around furtively and
then tell you that you are "number 8 on somebody's hit list.” 212 They
suggest that you “be careful and keep your head down.”213 They also
tell you they'd like to take over your business for a while and use it as
the base for a sting operation. Fanciful? Bad fiction? If so, life once
again imitates art.214
After their initial meeting in 1984, the FBI agents asked
Timothy Janowsky to abandon his legitimate business activities. 215
Instead, he would purchase gambling equipment, bribe corrupt
officials, record incriminating conversations, and engage in other
that, for all the familiar platitudes about public interest, government officials act in
pursuit of their own self-interest, the same as private parties. See generally James
Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
210
Gideon Kanner, Never Mind, ‘Only’ Property Rights Were Violated, WALL
STREET J., Aug. 25, 1993, A9.
211
Louis D. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
(1914).
212
Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
213
Id.
214
See Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
215
Id. at 889.
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crime-busting activities.216 How could any junior G-man resist?
Janowsky agreed,217 but he wasn't a complete fool. He recognized that
this conversion of his business from licit to illicit might leave him
holding a very empty bag when the Feds pulled out. He feared that his
heretofore legitimate business would be bankrupt, and he would be
compelled to begin his business life anew, having alienated all of his
former customers.
He wasn’t that patriotic. Or gullible. He got the FBI agents to
agree to indemnify him for any loss.218 And then he went to see his
lawyer, who drafted a contract to memorialize the indemnity
agreement.219 The contract recited that the value of the business had
been independently appraised at $643,200. 220 It then capped the
government's liability at $300,000 if Janowsky was unable to realize
even that much from a sale of his assets.221
The FBI agents passed the contract on to the U.S. Attorney,
with the notation that it had been drafted with FBI input and that FBI
headquarters had final authority over contracts. 222 Although some
government functionaries were busy rewriting the contract (to remove
any governmental indemnity responsibility), the covert operation
commenced. And it evidently worked. Mr. Janowsky obtained useful
information for the FBI. Unfortunately, the FBI blew his cover while
trying to convince one of the higher-ranking targets of the investigation
to cooperate. They revealed information that could only have come
from Janowsky.
At about that time, the government showed Mr. Janowsky its
revised contract—one that provided him with no economic safety net.
And then they told him about blowing his cover. They also told him
that one person had already been killed as a result of their investigation
and the only way the FBI could continue to protect him and his family
was if he continued to work with them—regardless of the terms of the
contract. The FBI apparently chose well in recruiting Mr. Janowsky.
During the four years they worked with him, they arrested several
miscreants, recovered $47,000 in back taxes, and seized $650,000 in
forfeited property (shades of the old AG budget balancing memo from
216

Id.
Id.
218
Id. at 889-90.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 889.
221
Id. at 890.
222
Id.
217
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a few years earlier). Janowsky and his family survived, but the
promised indemnity for the use of his property in pursuit of the public's
interest never materialized.
So, Janowsky sued, claiming breach of an implied contract, and
a taking of property without compensation. 223 And the same
government that had frightened, cajoled, and coerced him into
cooperating now turned on him, claiming he was entitled to nothing.
The trial court agreed, entering summary judgment for the defense, but
the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded. 224 The government hid
behind two defenses, neither of which held much water on this record.
First defense: there cannot have been a contract, because no one with
contracting authority on behalf of the government agreed to
anything.225 Second defense: the government could not have “taken”
anything because Mr. Janowsky voluntarily worked with the FBI to
nab the bad guys.226 Apparently both defenses were raised with a
straight face. Let’s look at each in turn.
The “lack of authority” defense is a bit of a shell game that the
federal government likes to play. In fact, the government convinced
the Supreme Court to establish the rule that “anyone entering into an
arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within
the bounds of his authority.”227 And in a breach of contract action
against the United States, the private contracting parties bear the
burden of proving that they dealt with an agent who was authorized to
bind the Government.228
But it is not that bleak. Even if the agents acting for the
government lack the actual authority to bind it, the government can
ratify their acts afterward. 229 Here, there were at least enough facts to
have a trial on ratification. The government was well aware of
Janowsky’s financial concerns. In fact, according to the record, he was
“adamant” that he be indemnified before risking his business in
government service. After all, it wasn’t a simple situation where the
government sought to take over an on-going business and continue to
223

Id. at 889.
Id. at 892.
225
Id. at 891.
226
Id. at 892.
227
Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
228
Hous. Corp. of Am. v. U. S., 199 Ct. Cl. 705, 711 (1972).
229
Silverman v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 701, 710 (1982).
224
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operate it.230 Here, the government ended Janowsky’s legitimate
business and replaced it with a phony criminal operation.231 Knowing
Janowsky’s concerns and proceeding with the project in the absence of
a formal contract raised, said the Court, at least a triable issue of fact. 232
The “volunteer” or “gift” ploy is also beloved by bureaucrats.
In the regulatory context, for example, when a government agency
exacts property or money from a property owner as a condition to the
issuance of a permit, the government likes to call that a “dedication,”
making it sound like a pleasant, voluntary act of civic charity. In
actuality, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted, such coerced donations can
be “out-and-out . . . extortion.”233
Where the trial judge saw voluntary cooperation by Janowsky,
the appellate panel saw coercion—or at least enough of it to go to trial.
Remember: this whole game began when FBI agents told Janowsky to
“keep his head down” because he was on a “hit list.” But if he would
help them, they would protect him. 234
Hardly the stuff of
voluntariness. Later, when it became apparent that no formal contract
would be forthcoming, the feds told Janowsky that they would
withdraw their protection from his family unless he continued to run
his business their way.235 Nice guys. That little ploy also undercut the
notion of any voluntariness.
Moreover, even though he may have had no constitutional right
to FBI protection, the FBI had no right to coerce the “donation” of his
property—i.e., the sacrifice of his constitutional right to just
compensation—as the price of retaining the discretionary benefit of
protection from mobsters. 236 Thus, concluded the court, “[b]y
threatening to withhold protection, especially after informing Timothy
Janowsky that he was on a hit list and compromising his cover, the FBI
coercively interfered with the Janowskys’ property right.” 237
Even men in black are bound by the Constitution. When their
actions take private property, they must make compensation.
230

133 F.3d at 889.
Id.
232
Id. at 892.
233
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). See supra notes 1518 and accompanying text.
234
Id. at 890.
235
Id.
236
See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
237
Janowsky, 133 F.3d at 892.
231
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DEFINITIONAL THEFT AS GOVERNMENT POLICY?

It is hard to improve on the United States Supreme Court’s
words in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey:238 “. . . complete
deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity
is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake. A
governmental entity can always find a use for extra money.” Thus, it
should have come as no surprise when the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals looked askance at a definitional game played by the State of
Washington. The State simply “skimmed”—to use the vernacular—
daily interest that should have been earned by members of the State’s
teacher retirement fund. 239 No problem, according to the State. As a
matter of state law, the teachers had no right to daily interest and
therefore had no complaint when the state simply took that interest for
its own use.240
Not so fast, said the appellate court. It is settled law that
interest follows the principal. 241 That is, whoever owns the principal
is entitled to interest on it. 242 And that would be the teachers whose
contributions made up the fund. Interest, said the court, accrues from
day to day, regardless of how a fund may be set up to make it
payable.243 As such, that interest was not the State’s to “redefine” into
something other than the private property of the teachers.244 The idea
is so deeply ingrained in our general precepts that it is entitled to
constitutional protection and not subject to confiscation at the whim of
a government entity.
The State’s position was based on the idea that states have the
right and the ability to define (and redefine) property interests. 245 The
underlying concept is true enough, but that does not give states the
power to run roughshod over private property rights by exercising
sleight-of-hand in purporting to redefine existing rights. The U.S.
Constitution in general, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in
particular, stand as a bulwark providing protection against

238

United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018).
240
Id. at 1118.
241
Id.
242
See, e.g., Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
243
899 F.3d at 1118.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 1118-19.
239
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confiscation.246 In short, the ability to define—or even re-define—
property rights does not mean that such wordplay may be done without
compliance with the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation
guarantee.247 The power to define is not the power to confiscate. 248
In this case, the State decided that the funds did not earn interest
on a daily basis and thus nothing could have been taken from the
teachers when the daily interest was placed into the State’s own
treasury.249 Wrong. As the appellate court put it, “a State may not
sidestep the Takings clause by disavowing traditional property
interests long recognized under state law.”250 In other words,
redefinition in order to enrich the State ran afoul of the U.S.
Constitution. In the court’s words, “there is a core notion of
constitutionally protected property into which state regulation simply
may not intrude without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny.”251 The
opinion had no difficulty in concluding that interest on funds was the
constitutional property of those who owned the funds, regardless of
what some state statute might say. 252 The appellate opinion is on solid
E.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying . . .”); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Foundation, 524 U.S.
156, 167 (1998) (“a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
traditional property interests long recognized under state law”); First Eng.
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)
(“[G]overnment action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates
the constitutional obligation to pay just compensation”) (emphasis added); Ark.
Game & Fish Commn. v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 33 (2012) (any sort of taking
places on the government a “categorical duty” to compensate).
247
E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (“Any
limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation) .
. . .”); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (“States do not have the unfettered authority to
‘shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations,
leaving landowners without recourse against unreasonable regulations.”).
248
Professor Tribe noted this truth in the early days of modern takings law.
Analyzing Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), he queried, “Did the
government effect a taking by saying to the general public, ‘Come on in, the water’s
fine.” (Laurence H. Tribe, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 176 (Harvard University Press
1985)). The Court had answered the question by voiding the government action. In
Tribe’s words, the owners possessed “investment-backed expectations rising to the
status of property rights for which the government must pay when it effectively
nationalizes them.” Id. at 176-77.
249
899 F.3d at 1115.
250
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998).
251
Guerin v. Fowler, 899 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).
252
Id.
246
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ground.253 Is there any doubt that balancing a state’s budget by theft
of property from teachers’ retirement funds is off limits? And that
should have been the end of that. But the State pressed on. It filed a
petition for writ of certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to validate its
right to steal (one gropes for a better word, but none occurs) funds from
private citizens to help the State cover its own bills. Certiorari was
denied.254
In a nutshell, the State’s position was that a state has the
absolute right to decide what constitutes “property” within its borders,
and it is free both to define and to redefine that concept at will. 255 More
than that, the State claimed that the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which precludes suing a state for damages, also
immunizes states from injunctive relief when the state’s actions violate
the constitutional rights of its citizens. 256 Fortunately, there are courts
willing to stand in the path of such assertions.
VII.

CHICANERY IN THE PRESS

A bit of dark humor to end this article. We might have entitled
this section “Chicken Little Goes to the Airport,” but that seemed a
little too flip for a scholarly journal.
In 1972, the California Supreme Court decided Nestle v. City
of Santa Monica.257 The key holding was that airport operators could
be liable to their neighbors under settled theories of nuisance law for
the noxious by-products of aircraft using their facilities.258 The City
of Los Angeles, which was not a party to the litigation, went into panic
mode (or at least some parts of its internal apparatus did). Its City
Attorney prepared a “confidential” letter (said to be covered by the
attorney-client privilege) to the Los Angeles City Council, the Mayor,
and the Board of Airport Commissioners analyzing the Nestle opinion
and projecting its impact on the much greater operations under the
control of Los Angeles—primarily Los Angeles International Airport
253

See cases discussed supra notes 102-03.
Guerin v. Fowler, No. 18-1545 (2019).
255
This pushes the concept of federalism beyond the bounds. See generally Michael
M. Berger, What’s Federalism Got to do With Regulatory Takings? 8 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1 (2019).
256
That defense has been moribund at least since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
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(LAX). In that letter, the City Attorney purported to “advise” his client
that the impact of nuisance liability at LAX would be so massive that
the airport needed to close. In his words:
It would therefore appear that the only prudent course
for the city to follow is to advise all the airlines using
Los Angeles International Airport and the Federal
Aviation Administration that in 30 days the airport will
suspend operations.259
Notwithstanding the “confidential” nature of this communication, a
copy of the letter was instantly “leaked” to the Los Angeles HeraldExaminer which, believing that it had a real scoop on its hands, put out
an “Extra” edition of that evening’s paper with this double banner
headline, in letters two inches high:260

This type of publicity continued at a fever pitch for two weeks,
with hearings by the City Council and the Airport Commissioners and
extensive lobbying at the State Legislature in an effort to obtain
legislation that would at least put such potential liability on hold for a
while. The City Attorney continued to say publicly that he was “deadly
serious” and attempting to prevent “catastrophic liability” that could

259
260

Quoted in Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, May 2, 1972, A8.
Id.
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raise Los Angeles taxes by $10,000 for “every man, woman and
child.”261
After weeks of hearings and press conferences, the Los
Angeles City Attorney conceded that it had all been a “ploy”—an
attempt to stampede the Supreme Court into reconsidering Nestle.262
It didn’t work, although it spooked a lot of ordinary folk (not to
mention the editors at the Herald-Examiner). In case you hadn’t
noticed, LAX is thriving—a half-century after Nestle unnerved some
municipal lawyers.
So, question: was the City Attorney’s little publicity stunt
appropriate? Was it ethical? Are these difficult questions? Should
they be?
IX.

CONCLUSION

These thoughts might be summed up by the idea that ethics in
land use goes quite a bit beyond questions of whether a developer can
take the mayor to lunch, or what can be discussed on the golf course,
or whether developers and environmentalists are entitled to equal
access to planning staffs. There is an overriding ethical content to land
use practice. It is grounded in what the Supreme Court keeps calling
fundamental issues of fairness.263 And it is backed by a constitutional
guarantee. As the Ninth Circuit put it:
[G]overnmental power is a double-edged sword; if
wielded in an abusive, irrational or malicious fashion it
can cause grave harm. 264
....
We have recognized that the due process clause
includes a substantive component which guards against
261
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arbitrary and capricious government action, even when
the decision to take that action is made through
procedures that are in themselves constitutionally
adequate. [Citation.]265
I am not alone in being concerned about the tactics described in this
article. As noted even by knowledgeable commentators who are
sympathetic to the regulators, such unfortunate behavior patterns have
become all too common. 266 It is time that ethical discussions about
land use reach for a higher level: “[t]he government should be an
example to its citizens, and by that is meant a good example and not a
bad one.”267
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